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MATCHING GAMES: THE LEAST CORE AND THE NUCLEOLUS
WALTER KERN AND DANI ¨EL PAULUSMA
ABSTRACT. A matching game is a cooperative game defined by a graph G D
.V; E/. The player set is V and the value of a coalition S  V is defined as
the size of a maximum matching in the subgraph induced by S. We show that
the nucleolus of such games can be computed efficiently. The result is based
on an alternative characterization of the least core which may be of independent
interest. The general case of weighted matching games remains unsolved.
1. INTRODUCTION
A cooperative game is defined by a set N of players and a value function v : 2N!
R, associating a value v.S/ to every subset (coalition) S  N . We assume that
v.;/ D 0. The value v.S/ of a coalition S  N is interpreted as the total gain the
members of S can achieve by cooperating.
The central problem in cooperative game theory is how to allocate the total gain
v D v.N / among the individual players i 2 N in a “fair” way. There are various
notions of fairness and corresponding allocation rules (solution concepts).
Clearly, a useful solution concept should not only be “fair” in an adequate sense but
also efficiently computable. The computational complexity of - by now classical -
solution concepts has therefore been studied with growing interest during the last
years (see, e.g., Deng and Papadimitriou [1994], Granot and Granot [1992], Granot
et al. [1996], Faigle et al. [1997],[1998a], Faigle, Kern and Kuipers [1998b], Deng,
Ibaraki and Nagamochi [1999]).
The most prominent and widely accepted solution concept is the core of a game:
core.N; v/ :D fx 2 RN j x.N / D v; x.S/  v.S/ for all S ( Ng:
Here, we use the shorthand notation
x.S/ :D
X
i2S
xi
for S  N . Any x 2 RN with x.N / D v is an allocation. So a core allocation
x 2 RV guarantees each coalition S  N to be satisfied in the sense that it gets at
least what it could gain on its own.
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If the core is empty (and even in case it is not) one might try to find allocations x
in the least core, satisfying all coalitions S ( N as much as possible. To this end
we let F0 :D f;; Ng and consider the LP
.P1/ max 
s:t: x.S/  v.S/C  .S =2 F0/
x.N / D v
with optimum value 1 2 R. (Clearly, 1  0 if and only if core(N; v) 6D ;.)
We let P1./ denote the set of all x 2 RV such that .x; / satisfies the constraints
of (P1). So core(N; v)D P1.0/. The least core is defined as
leastcore.N; v/ :D P1.1/:
The excess of a coalition ; 6D S ( N with respect to an allocation x 2 RV is defined
as
e.S; x/ :D x.S/− v.S/:
So least core allocations are those that maximize the minimal excess. If the least
core is not yet a single point, one might try to find “the best” allocation in the
least core by further pursuing the idea of maximizing minimum excess: Given
an allocation x 2 RV define the excess vector .x/ to be the 2N − 2 dimensional
vector whose components are the excesses e.S; x/; ; 6D S ( N , ordered non-
decreasingly. The nucleolus (Schmeidler [1969]) is then the (unique!) allocation
x 2 RV that lexicographically maximizes .x/.
Although computational aspects shall be discussed later, it is immediately clear that
computing the nucleolus by explicit lexicographic optimization of the excess vec-
tor is infeasible: In general there are exponentially (in jNj) many different excess
values, whereas an efficient procedure should be polynomial in jNj. The stan-
dard procedure for computing the nucleolus proceeds by solving up to jNj linear
programs. To present it we introduce the following notation: For a polyhedron
P  RN let
Fix P :D fS  N j x.S/ D y.S/ for all x; y 2 Pg
denote the set of coalitions fixed by P.
Now, assume we have determined the least core P1.1/. We then proceed to max-
imize the minimal excess on those coalitions which are not already fixed, i.e., we
solve
.P2/ max 
s:t: x 2 P1.1/
x.S/  v.S/C  S =2 Fix P1.1/
and let 2 > 1 be the corresponding optimum value. Extending our previous no-
tation in the obvious way, we let P2./ denote the set of all x 2 RN satisfying the
constraints of (P2) for  2 R. Now proceed to
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.P3/ max 
s:t: x 2 P2.2/
x.S/  v.S/C  .S =2 Fix P2.2//
etc. until
.Pr/ max 
s:t: x 2 Pr−1.r−1/
x.S/  v.S/C  .S =2 Fix Pr−1.r−1//
defines a unique solution x 2 RV , the nucleolus of the game.
Since the feasible regions of the above sequence of LP’s decrease in dimension,
we conclude that r  jNj. So we compute at most jNj different excess values
explicitly. Note, however, that in each step we have to identify the set Fix Pi.i/.
Furthermore, the number of constraints in each (Pi) remains exponential in jNj.
The above “Linear Programming approach” to the nucleolus is also interesting
from a structural point of view, as it implies a nice bound on the size < x > of
the nucleolus (number of bits necessary to represent x). Let < v > denote the
maximum size of the v-values, i.e., < v >:D maxf< v.S/ > j S  Ng.
Theorem 1.1. The nucleolus of (N; v) has size bounded polynomially in jNj and
< v >.
Proof: Let F0  : : :  Fr−1  2N denote the increasing sequence of fixed sets in
.P1/; : : : ; .Pr/, i.e., F0 D f;; Ng and
Fi :D Fix Pi.i/ .i D 1; : : : ; r− 1/:
Then the unique lexicographic optimum of
lex-max .Q1; : : : ; Qr; x1; : : : ; xjNj/
s:t: x.N / D v
x.S/  v.S/C Q1 .S =2 F0/
x.S/  v.S/C Q2 .S =2 F1/
.
.
.
x.S/  v.S/C Qr .S =2 Fr−1/
equals .1; : : : ; r; x/, where x is the nucleolus and 1; : : : ; r are the optimum
values of .P1/; : : : ; .Pr/. Hence .1; : : : ; r; x/ is a vertex of the feasibility re-
gion of the above program. As such its size is polynomial in the dimension r C
jNj D O.jNj/ and the maximum size of a constraint (i.e., the facet complexity, cf.
Gro¨tschel, Lova´sz and Schrijver [1988]). The latter is bounded by jNjC < v >.
}
As to complexity issues in cooperative game theory, various results have been ob-
tained for particular classes of games and solution concepts. For example, so-
called minimum spanning tree games have been studied with respect to core, least
core and nucleolus, cf. Meggido [1987], Granot et al. [1996], Faigle et al. [1997],
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Faigle, Kern and Paulusma [1999]. Deng, Ibaraki and Nagamochi [1999] analyze
the core of various combinatorial games with respect to complexity. Granot, Gra-
not and Zhu [1998] study the complexity of the nucleolus in general.
The present paper deals with so-called matching games (cf. section 2) which have
been studied already earlier. Solymosi and Raghavan [1994] present an efficient
algorithm for computing the nucleolus in the bipartite case (so-called assignment
games). Deng, Ibaraki and Nagamochi [1999] characterize when the core is empty
(cf. also section 2). Faigle et al. [1998a] introduce the nucleon as an alternative to
the nucleolus, present an efficient algorithm for computing the nucleon and point
out that the problem of computing the nucleolus remains unsolved. Faigle, Kern
and Kuipers [1998c] prove a general result on the complexity of the so-called ker-
nel (a subset of the least core) of a game. As a consequence of this, computing
an element in the least core is easy for matching games. The complexity of the
nucleolus remains unsolved yet. In the current paper we solve the “unweighted
case” by presenting an efficient algorithm for computing the nucleolus of cardinal-
ity matching games. Our result is based on a polynomial description of the least
core of such games, which might be of independent interest.
2. MATCHING GAMES
Let G D .V; E/ be a graph and w : E ! RC an edge weighting. We use the
following standard notation: For S  V we let E.S/  E denote the set of edges
joining vertices of S. For F  E we let V .F/ denote the set of vertices covered by
F. G and w define a cooperative game with player set V . The value of a coalition
S  V is given by
v.S/ :D maxfw.M/ j M  E.S/ is a matching g;
the maximum weight matching in the subgraph induced by S.
In the following we restrict ourselves to cardinality matching games. These arise
when w  1, i.e., the value function is given by
v.S/ :D maxf jMj j M  E.S/ is a matching g:
Example
(i) Let G D K2 be the complete graph on two nodes. Then (P1) has a unique
optimal solution, given by the nucleolus x D . 12 ; 12 / and 1 D 12 .
In the following we assume that G 6D K2.
(ii) Let GD .V; E/ be the graph as shown in Figure 2.1. V is split into fag [ D1[
D2. Then (P1) has a unique optimal solution: the nucleolus x given by
xi D
(
4
7 if i D a
3
7 if i 2 D1 [ D2
and 1 D −37 .
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D
Figure 2.1
(iii) Let G D .V; E/ be the graph as shown in Figure 2.2. We have V D D1 [
D2 [ D3. Then 1 D −1 and P1.−1/ contains all allocations x 2 R11 for which
xi D x j .i; j 2 Dp; p D 1; : : : ; 3/
xi C x j D 12 .i 2 D1; j 2 D2/
xi D 12 .i 2 D3/
x  0:
The nucleolus x is given by
x  14 on D1 [ D2
x  12 on D3:
3
21D D
D
Figure 2.2
In the following we shall need some fundamental results and concepts from match-
ing theory: A (near-) perfect matching is one that covers all nodes (except one).
A graph is factor-critical if removing any point results in a perfectly matchable
graph.
If A  V , we let as usual GnA denote the graph obtained by removing A. A
component of GnA is called even or odd if it has an even respectively odd number
of nodes. We let C D C .A/ denote the set of even components of GnA and D D
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D .A/ the set of odd components of GnA. Recall that A  V is called a Tutte set if
each maximum matching M of G decomposes as
M D MC [ MA;D [ MD ;
where MC is a perfect matching in
S
C , the union of all even components. MD
induces a near-perfect matching in all odd components D 2 D and MA;D is a
matching which matches A (completely) into SD , the union of odd components.
Equivalently, A is a Tutte-set if and only if the size v of a maximum matching in
G equals
v D
X
C2C
jCj
2
C jAj C
X
D2D
.jDj − 1/
2
:
Tutte sets can be found efficiently. More precisely, the following is true (see, e.g.,
Lova´sz and Plummer [1986])
Theorem 2.1 (Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition). Given G D .V; E/ one can effi-
ciently construct a Tutte set A  V such that
(i) all odd components D 2D are factor-critical
(ii) for each D 2D there is some maximum matching which does not completely
cover D.
In the following we assume that A  V is a (fixed) Tutte set satisfying the condi-
tions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 2.1. We let M  denote the set of maximum matchings
in G. Each M 2M  matches A completely in D . By condition (ii) of Theorem
2.1, given D 2D there is some M 2M  matching A into DnfDg. We say that M
leaves D uncovered.
We will sometimes identify subsets of V with the corresponding induced sub-
graphs. For example, if i 2 V is a vertex we do not hesitate to write i 2 D to
indicate that i is a vertex of the component D 2 D . If x 2 RV is an allocation, we
consequently write
x.D/ D
X
i2D
x.i/:
Finally, we also extend our general shorthand notation in the following way, if no
misunderstanding is possible: If e D .i; j/ 2 E, we write x.e/ D x.fi; jg/. More
generally, if M  E is a matching, we let x.M/ :D x.V .M//.
After these preliminaries let us study core(G) and leastcore(G), the core and least
core of the matching game defined by G. We start with the following simple ob-
servation (cf. also Deng, Ibaraki and Nagamochi [1999]):
Theorem 2.2. The matching game defined by G D .V; E/ has non-empty core
(1  0) if and only if jDj D 1 for all D 2D .
Proof: “(”: Suppose jDj D 1 for all D 2D . Then x 2 RV defined by
x  12 on
S
C
x  1 on A
x  0 on SD
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is easily seen to be in the core.
“)”: Suppose D 2 D with jDj  3. Let e D .i; j/ 2 E.D/. From Theorem 2.1
we conclude that Gni and Gn j have matchings of size v. So if x 2 RV were in the
core, then
x.Vni/  v.Vni/ D v and x.Vn j/  v.Vn j/D v:
Furthermore, x.e/ D x.fi; jg/  1. Together, these imply x.V / > v, a contradic-
tion. Hence the core must be empty.
}
Since the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition can be computed efficiently, we can eas-
ily check whether the core is empty or not. In the latter case, the least core and the
nucleolus are straightforward to compute. This is essentially due to the fact that all
i are non-negative:
Theorem 2.3. In case of non-empty core (1  0) the least core equals the set of
allocations x 2 RV solving
.PC1 / max 
s:t: x.e/  1C  for all e 2 E
xi   for all i 2 V
x.V / D v:
Proof: The proof is straightforward, using the fact that the above constraints (for
  0) imply x.S/  v.S/C  for all S ( N .
}
Remark 2.1. Note that the optimum value C1 D 1 of the LP in Theorem 2.3 is
always at most 0. (Recall that we assume that G 6D K2, in which case 1 D 12 .)
Continuing in a similar way, also the nucleolus can be computed easily. We first
identify
E1 :D fe 2 E j e 2 Fix PC1 .C1 /g and V1 :D fi 2 V j i 2 Fix PC1 .C1 /g
and then solve
.PC2 / max 
s:t: x.e/ D 1C C1 .e 2 E1/
xi D C1 .i 2 V1/
x.e/  1C  .e 2 EnE1/
xi   .i 2 VnV1/
x.V / D v:
with optimum value C2 D 2 etc.
Remark 2.2. Note that also for general weighted matching games with non-empty
core, a similar characterization of the (least) core and nucleolus exists.
8 WALTER KERN AND DANI ¨EL PAULUSMA
The above approach fails in case 1 < 0. In this case, at least intuitively, large
coalitions S  V get fixed in the first place rather than small ones (single nodes
and edges) as above. The case 1 < 0 (empty core) is treated in section 3.
3. WHEN THE CORE IS EMPTY
In the following we assume that the core is empty. Equivalently, 1 < 0 and jDj> 1
for some odd component D 2D . We first state the following simple fact (which in
the non-empty core case follows trivially from Theorem 2.3):
Lemma 3.1. leastcore(G)  RVC.
Proof: Assume to the contrary that (x; 1) is an optimal solution of
.P1/ max 
s:t: x.S/  v.S/C  .S =2 F0/
x.V / D v
and xi < 0 for some i 2 V .
Claim: If S  V satisfies x.S/  v.S/C 1 with equality, then i 2 S.
Proof: Assume to the contrary that i =2 S.
case 1. S  S [ i  V .
Then x.S [ i/ < x.S/ D v.S/C 1  v.S [ i/C 1 contradicts the feasibility of x.
case 2. S  S [ i D V .
Then x.V /D x.S/C xi D v.S/C 1C xi < v.S/  v again contradicts the feasi-
bility of x.
Hence the claim is true. But then we may slightly increase x on fig and decrease
x on Vni uniformly by the same total amount, thereby obtaining a better solution.
This proves the lemma.
}
Due to Lemma 3.1 the problem (P1) defining the least core can equivalently be
stated as follows. Let M denote the set of matchings M  E. Then (recall our
notation x.M/ D x.V .M// from section 2):
.P1/ max 
s:t: x.M/  jMj C  .M 2M /
x.V / D v
x  0:
Proposition 3.1. Checking whether a given x 2 RV is an element of P1./ can be
done in polynomial time.
Proof: It suffices to show that for given x 2RV and  2Rwe can sufficiently check
whether
x.M/  jMj C  .M 2M /
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holds. This can be done by solving a minimum weight matching problem on G D
.V; E/ with respect to the edge weights
wi j :D xi C x j − 1 ..i; j/ 2 E/;
see, e.g., Lova´sz and Plummer [1986].
}
As a consequence of Proposition 3.1 we can solve (P1) efficiently (cf. Faigle, Kern
and Kuipers [1998c] for more detail.) Here we aim for more, namely a concise
description of P1.1/.
As a first step we introduce a relaxation ( OP1) of (P1) below which is easier to
analyze and, as we shall see, defines the same optimum value. To motivate this ap-
proach, note that, as mentioned earlier, we expect rather large matchings to become
tight when solving (P1). Let M  denote the set of maximum matchings in G and
let MD denote the set of matchings M  E.
S
D / which are completely contained
in the union of the odd components.
We shall study the following relaxation of (P1):
. OP1/ max 
s:t: x.M/  jMj C  .M 2M  [MD /
x.V / D v
x  0
with optimum value O1. (As in the proof of Theorem 2.2, it is easy to see that
O1 < 0, cf. also below.)
To investigate the structure of optimal solutions of ( OP1), let us introduce some
notation. As before, OP1./ denotes the set of x 2 RV such that (x; ) is feasible for
( OP1). If x 2 OP1.O1/ is an optimal solution, we say that M 2M  [MD is x-tight, if
x.M/ D jMj C O1. Given a feasible solution x 2 OP1./ and D 2D , let
xD :D x.D/jDj
denote the average value of x on D. Define Nx 2 RV by averaging x on each com-
ponent D 2D , i.e.,
Nxi :D xD .i 2 D; D 2D /
and leaving x unchanged on A[SC .
Lemma 3.2. If x 2 OP1./ then Nx 2 OP1./ and  < 0.
Proof: Let x 2 OP1./. It suffices to show that averaging x on some component D 2
D preserves feasibility. Thus let D 2D and let Qx 2 RV be obtained by averaging x
on D, i.e., Qxi D xD .i 2 D/.
Certainly Qx satisfies Qx  0 and Qx.V / D v. We are left to check Qx.M/  jMj C 
for M 2M  [MD .
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Suppose M 2M . Then either M covers D or M\ DD Dni for some i 2 D. In the
first case Qx.M/ D x.M/ and the claim follows. In the second case we may assume
without loss of generality that i 2 D maximizes xi over D, otherwise we replace
M inside D by some other near-perfect matching without changing Qx.M/− jMj.
(Recall that D is factor-critical.) But then xi  Qxi and consequently Qx.M/ x.M/,
so the claim follows as x 2 OP1./.
Next consider M 2MD and assume M minimizes Qx.M/− jMj over MD . If Qx 
xD >
1
2 on D, then M \ D D ;. Hence Qx.M/ D x.M/ and the claim follows. If
Qx xD  12 on D, then M \ D is without loss of generality a near-perfect matching
in D and we argue as we did for M 2M .
Finally, let us show that  < 0. Let D 2D be a component with jDj > 1. If Nx  0
on D, then   −1. (Indeed, if e 2 E.D/, then 0 D Nx.e/  1C .) If Nx  xD > 0
on D, let M 2M  be a maximum matching leaving some i 2 D unmatched. Then
Nx.M/  v C  and Nx.M/ < Nx.M [ i/  Nx.V / D v. Hence  < 0.
}
We conclude that O1 < 0. If x 2 OP1.O1/ is an optimal allocation, so is Nx. Further-
more, some matchings in M  [MD must be Nx-tight. These can in principle be
found by minimizing Nx.M/− jMj over M  [MD . Minimizing Nx.M/− jMj over
M  amounts to solving a minimum weight maximum matching problem. Min-
imizing Nx.M/− jMj over MD is even trivial: We simply choose a near-perfect
matching in each component D 2D with Nx  xD < 12 (plus an arbitrary matching
in all components on which Nx D 12 ). So computing an Nx-tight M 2M  [MD for
given Nx 2 OP1.O1/ is easy.
We aim at a more structural characterization of Nx-tight matchings for given Nx 2
OP1.O1/. Let Dmax DDmax. Nx/ D be the set of odd components on which Nx  xD
is maximum (among all D 2D).
Lemma 3.3. No Nx-tight M 2 M  covers all D 2 Dmax. If Nx-tight matchings in
M  exist at all, then for each D 2 Dmax there is some Nx-tight M 2M  leaving D
uncovered.
Proof: Suppose NM 2 M  is Nx-tight and covers D 2 Dmax. Let QM 2 M  be any
matching not covering D. (Recall Theorem 2.1.) Let P  NM [ QM be the unique
maximal alternating path starting in D (in a node uncovered by QM) and ending in,
say, QD (in a node uncovered by NM). Reversing NM along P results in a matching
M 2 M  covering QD instead of D. Since D 2 Dmax, we have NxD  Nx QD, hence
Nx.M/  Nx. NM/.
Thus M must be Nx-tight again, proving the second claim. The first claim follows by
observing that if NM would cover all D 2 Dmax, then QD =2 Dmax (as it is uncovered
by NM). But then NxD > Nx QD and Nx.M/ < Nx. NM/, hence
Nx.M/ < Nx. NM/ D j NMj C O1 D jMj C O1;
contradicting Nx 2 OP1.O1/.
}
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Let M D denote the set of all maximum matchings in MD .
Lemma 3.4. Let x 2 OP1.O1/. Then
(i) x D Nx
(ii) x  12 on
S
D
(iii) Each M 2M D is x-tight.
Proof: Let x 2 OP1.O1/. We first prove (ii) and (iii) for Nx and then show that x D Nx.
(ii) Nx  12 on
S
D:
Suppose to the contrary that Nx > 12 on D 2Dmax.
We first consider the case A [SC D ;. If Dmax D D , we had Nx > 12 on SD
and hence Nx.V / > v, a contradiction. Hence Dmax ( D . Then we may decrease
Nx slightly and uniformly on S Dmax and increase Nx on SDnSDmax resulting
in some NNx 2 OP1.O1/ for which no M 2 M  [MD is tight. This contradicts the
optimality of O1.
Now suppose A[SC 6D ;. If DmaxDD , we had Nx > 12 onSD and hence no M 2
MD were Nx-tight. We may thus decrease Nx on
S
D and increase Nx on A[SC by
the same (sufficiently small) amount  > 0 resulting in some Nx 2 OP1.O1/ for which
no M 2M  [MD is tight. (Recall Lemma 3.3.) This contradicts the optimality of
O1.
If Dmax (D , we proceed similarly. Chose  > 0 sufficiently small and let Nx arise
from Nx by
 decreasing Nxi by jDj (i 2 D; D 2Dmax)
 increasing Nx on A by 0 in total, where .jDmaxj − 1/ < 0 < jDmaxj
 increasing Nx uniformly on SDnSDmax by jDmaxj− 0 in total.
For sufficiently small  > 0 the resulting Nx has Nx.M/ > Nx.M/ for each Nx-tight
M 2MD (since none of these meets Dmax) and Nx.M/ > Nx.M/ for all Nx-tight M 2
M  by Lemma 3.3. Hence, again Nx 2 OP1.O1/ has no tight matchings, contradicting
the optimality of O1.
(iii) Each M 2 M D is Nx-tight: Since Nx  12 on
S
D, each M 2 M D minimizes
Nx.M/− jMj over MD. It therefore suffices to show that some matching in MD is
Nx-tight. Assume to the contrary that no matching in MD is Nx-tight. As above, this
exludes M  MD , so A[
S
C must be non-empty.
case 1. Nx.SD / > 0.
In this case we may slightly (and uniformly) decrease Nx on SDmax and increase it
by the same total amount on A [SC . By Lemma 3.3 the resulting NNx has no tight
matchings, a contradiction.
case 2. Nx  0 on SD .
Then Nx.M/ D v for M 2 M . Since O1 < 0, no M 2 M  were tight either, a
contradiction.
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(i) x D Nx:
For each D 2D we chose a node i 2D with maximum x-value and a near-perfect
matching covering Dni. Let M 2M D be the union of all these near-perfect match-
ings. By construction we have x.M/  Nx.M/ with equality if and only if x  Nx onS
D . But since M is Nx-tight,
x.M/ < Nx.M/D jMj C O1
would contradict x 2 OP1.O1/.
}
Lemma 3.5. Let x D Nx 2 OP1.O1/. Then there is some x-tight M 2M . Moreover,
if D 2Dmax or jDj > 1 then there is some x-tight M 2M  not covering D.
Proof: The lemma is trivial in case A [SC D ;. So we suppose ASC 6D ; and
we first claim that any x 2 OP1.O1/ has x.A [
S
C / > 0. Indeed, any M 2 M 
decomposes as
M D MC [ MA;D [ MD
with MC a perfect matching of
S
C , MA;D matching A into D and MD 2 M D .
Since x 2 OP1.O1/, we have
x.M/  jMC j C jMA;D j C jMD j C O1:
Since MD is x-tight (cf. Lemma 3.4(ii)), we have x.MD / D jMD j C O1, hence
x.MC [ MA;D /  jMC j C jMA;D j. Since x  12 on
S
D , we conclude that indeed
x.A [
[
C / D x.A [ MC /  jAj2 C jMC j > 0:
Now let us show that some M 2 M  is Nx-tight. Suppose to the contrary that
x.M/ > jMj C O1 for all M 2 M . We could then decrease (somehow) Nx on
A [SC and increase Nx uniformly on SD by the same total (sufficiently small)
amount. The resulting NNx were still in OP1.O1/ and would contradict Lemma 3.4 (iii).
By Lemma 3.3, this implies that each D 2 Dmax is uncovered by some Nx-tight
M 2 M . We are left to prove a corresponding result for D 2 D with jDj > 1.
Hence assume D 2 DnDmax and jDj > 1. Then Nx < 12 on D by Lemma 3.4 (ii),
so every Nx-tight M 2M D contains a near-perfect matching of D. Now suppose D
is covered by every Nx-tight M 2M . We may then decrease Nx slightly on A [ C
and increase x uniformly on D by the same (sufficiently small) total amount. The
resulting NNx would again be in OP1.O1/ and contradict Lemma 3.4(iii). This finishes
the proof.
}
Let us call an allocation x D Nx 2 OP1.O1/ flexible if the conclusion of Lemma 3.5
holds with respect to all D 2 D , i.e., if each D 2 D is uncovered by some Nx-tight
M 2M .
Lemma 3.6. Flexible allocations exist.
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Proof: Let x D Nx 2 P1.O1/. Suppose Nx is not already flexible. Then there exists
a component D D fig 2 D of size 1 such that every Nx-tight M 2M  covers i. In
particular, this implies that A 6D ;. We may thus increase Nxi and decrease Nx on
A by the same total amount  until Nx becomes “flexible” with respect to D D fig.
In other words, we choose  > 0 maximal such that the modification Nx is still in
OP.O1/. Then Nx.M/D jMj C O1 holds for a matching M 2M  that does not cover
i (and is not Nx-tight). Because all matchings in M  that were already Nx-tight (and
contain i) remain tight, the claim follows by induction.
}
We are now ready to determine the structure of x-tight matchings in M  for flexible
x D Nx 2 OP1.O1/. Suppose Ox 2 OP.O1/ is a given flexible allocation. Suppose that
o < : : : < p .p  0/ are the different values Ox takes on
S
D and let
D DD0 [ : : :[Dp
be the corresponding partition of D . Hence Ox  i on
S
Di and Dp DDmax.
Proposition 3.2. There exists a partition A D A0 [ : : :[ A p (with some of the Ai
possibly empty) such that M 2M  is Ox-tight if and only if M matches each Ai into
Di.
Proof: If A D ;, the claim is true in the sense that nothing is matched into D and
each M 2M  is Ox-tight. (By Lemma 3.5, some Nx-tight M 2M  exists and since
A D ;, all M 2M  DM D have the same Ox-value.)
In general, recall that Ox-tight matchings in M  are exactly those that minimize
Ox.M/ over M . For given Ox, the value Ox.M/ only depends on how many nodes
of A are matched into each Di. (This readily follows from the decomposition
M D MC [ MA;C [MD .) In other words, Ox.M/ only depends on the total Ox-weight
of nodes in
S
D that are matched with A. The claim therefore follows from Lemma
3.7 below.
}
Lemma 3.7. Consider a bipartite graph G.A; B/ with node set A [ B. Suppose
B D B0 [ : : : [ Bp is a partition of B and edges incident with Bi have weight i
(0 < : : : < p/. Assume that the set M  of matchings that completely match A
into B is non-empty and let M min be the set of M 2M  with minimum weight. Sup-
pose finally, that M min is “flexible” in the sense that each b 2 B is left unmatched
by some M 2 M min. Then there is a partition A D A0 [ : : : [ A p of A such that
M 2M min if and only if M matches Ai into Bi (i D 0; : : : ; p).
Proof: Let M 0 denote the set of maximum matchings in the subgraph G0 induced
by A [ B0. Clearly, each M 2 M min induces a maximum matching M0  M in
M 0 . (Apply an augmenting path argument.) Hence we must have
./ Each b 2 B0 is left uncovered by some M0 2M 0 :
Suppose m0 is the maximum size of a matching in G0. As G0 is bipartite, Ko¨nigs
Theorem ensures the existence of a vertex cover A0 [ B0 (A0  A; B0  B) of
size m0. Each M 2M 0 is incident with all nodes in A0 [ B0. Hence, by (*) we
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conclude that B0 D ;. In other words, each M 2M min matches A0 into B0. The
claim follows by induction.
}
We are now prepared to present our main result, a simple alternative description of
the least core. Consider the LP
.
OOP1/ max 
s:t: x D Nx
xi  12 .i 2
S
D /
x.e/  1 .e 2 EnE.SD //
x.V / D v
x.M/  jMj C  .M 2M D /
x  0:
Note that x  Nx is just a shorthand for a number of linear equalities of the type
xi D x j. Further note that for x  Nx the value x.M/ is independent of the particular
choice of M 2M D. Hence the exponentially many constraints for M 2M D reduce
to one single inequality.
Again, we let OOP1./ :D fx j .x; /is feasible for. OOP1/g and denote the optimum
value of ( OOP1) by OO1.
Theorem 3.1. We have 1 D O1 D OO1 and leastcore.G/ D P1.1/ D OOP1. OO1/
Proof:
 We have 1  O1 by definition.
 O1  OO1: Let Ox 2 OP1.O1/ be flexible with corresponding partitions D D
D0 [ : : :[Dp and A D A0 [ : : :[ A p. Define OOx 2 RV by
OOx  12 on
S
C
OOx  Ox on D
OOx  1− i on Ai:
We show that OOx 2 OOP1.O1/ (proving that OO1  O1). The only non-trivial constraints
to check are OOx.V / D v and OOx.e/  1 for e 2 EnE.S D/. All other constraints
directly follow from Lemma 3.4.
Let M 2M  be Ox-tight and decompose it as
M D MC [ MA;D [ MD
as usual. Since MD 2M D is also Ox-tight by Lemma 3.4, we conclude that Ox.MC [
MA;D / D jMC j C jMA;D j D OOx.MC [ MA;D / by definition of OOx. Hence OOx.V / D
Ox.V /D v.
Secondly, let us consider e 2 EnE.SD /. If e 2 E.A [SC / then OOx.e/  1 by
definition of OOx. (Recall that Ox D i  12 on
S
Di.) Thus we are left with edges
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between A and
S
D . Suppose OOx.e/ < 1 for such an edge joining, say, D 2 Di
with a 2 A j. Then OOx.e/ D i C 1−  j < 1, i.e., i <  j. Since Ox is flexible, there
exists an Ox-tight matching M 2M  not covering D. Since D is factor-critical (and
Ox is constant on D), we may assume that M does not match the endpoint of e in D.
Since M is Ox-tight, a 2 A j is matched into D j by some edge f 2 M (cf. Proposition
3.2). But then M 0 D Mn f C e has Ox.M 0/ < Ox.M/, a contradiction.
 OO1  1: We show that in general OOP1./  P1./. Suppose x 2 OOP1./. Then
x.M/  jMj C  for all M 2M D . Since x  12 on
S
D , this also implies x.M/ 
jMj C  for all M 2MD. (Use an augmenting path argument.) Since x.e/  1 for
all e 2 EnE.S D/, we further conclude that x.M/  jMj C  for all M 2M .
 Finally, let us verify that P1.1/ D OOP1. OO1/. We have just proved that “”
holds. Conversely let x 2 P1.1/. Then x 2 OP1.O1/ and, by Lemma 3.4, x satisfies
all constraints of OOP1. OO1/ except possibly x.e/  1 for e 2 EnE.
S
D /. Thus let
e 2 EnE.SD /. Pick M 2M D not covering the endpoint of e inSD , so that M[ e
is a matching again. Then, since x 2 P1.1/, we have x.M [ e/  jMj C 1C 1,
and since M 2M D is x-tight, we have x.M/ D jMj C O1. Since 1 D O1, the claim
follows.
}
4. THE NUCLEOLUS
Recall from section 1 that the nucleolus is computed by solving the following se-
quence of LP’s:
.P1/ max 
s:t: x.S/  v.S/C  .S =2 f;; Vg/
x.V / D v
with optimum value 1,
.P2/ max 
s:t: x 2 P1.1/
x.S/  v.S/C  .S =2 Fix P1.1/ /
with optimum value 2, etc. until the nucleolus is finally determined as the unique
solution x,  D r of
.Pr/ max 
s:t: x 2 Pr−1.r−1/
x.S/  v.S/C  .S =2 Fix Pr−1.r−1/ /:
By Theorem 3.1, (P1) is equivalent to . OOP1/ in the sense that they define the same
set of optimal solutions. As we shall see, similar equivalent formulations can be
found for (Pk), k  2. Define recursively
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.
OOPk/ max 
s:t: x 2 OOPk−1. OOk−1/
x.e/  1C 1−  .e 2 E.
S
D /; e =2 Fix OOPk−1. OOk−1/ /
x.e/  1− 1C  .e 2 EnE.
S
D /; e =2 Fix OOPk−1. OOk−1/ /
xi  −1C  .i 2 V; i =2 Fix OOPk−1. OOk−1/ /:
As before, let OOk denote the optimum value of ( OOPk) and define OOPk./ in the obvious
way.
Theorem 4.1. We have k D OOk and Pk.k/ D OOPk. OOk/ for k D 1; : : : ; r. In partic-
ular, the sequence OOP1. OO1/  : : :  OOPr D fxg defines the nucleolus.
Proof: For k D 1 the claim is equivalent to Theorem 3.1. We proceed by induction
on k. Assume that k−1 D OOk−1 and Pk−1.k−1/D OOPk−1. OOk−1/. The induction step
amounts to show the following two things.
(i) Pk./  OOPk./ (implying that OOk  k) :
Let x 2 Pk./. Then x 2 P1.1/D OP1.O1/, so x satisfies x 0, x xD  12 (D 2D)
and x.M/ D jMj C 1 (M 2M D ).
We first consider e 2 EnE.SD) and show that x.e/  1 C  − 1 unless e 2
Fix OOPk−1. OOk−1/ D Fix Pk−1.k−1/. Choose M 2MD such that M [ e is a match-
ing. (Existence follows from the fact that each D 2 D is factor-critical.) Since M
is fixed by OOP1. OO1/D P1.1/, it is fixed by OOPk−1. OOk−1/. Hence e 2 Fix OOPk−1. OOk−1/
if and only if M [ e 2 Fix OOPk−1. OOk−1/. Since we assume e =2 Fix OOPk−1. OOk−1/, we
have M [ e =2 Fix Pk−1.k−1/ and thus x 2 Pk./ implies x.M [ e/  jM [ ej C .
Together with x.M/ D jMj C 1 this yields x.e/  1C − 1.
In the same way we can show that xi  − 1 for a vertex i =2 Fix OOP. OOk−1/.
Next consider e 2 E.SD /, say e 2 E.D/ for D 2 D . We show that x.e/  1−
C 1 unless e is already fixed by OOPk−1. OOk−1/ D Pk−1.k−1/. Since x  xD on
D 2D , we conclude that x.e/ is independent of the particular choice of e 2 E.D/.
Choose any M 2 MD and assume without loss of generality that e 2 M \ E.D/
is not fixed by Pk−1.k−1/. Since x.M/ is fixed (to jMj C 1), we conclude that
Mne =2 Fix Pk−1.k−1/. Hence x 2 Pk./ implies x.Mne/  jMnej C . Together
with x.M/ D jMj C 1 we get x.e/  1C 1 − .
(ii) OOPk./  Pk./ (implying that k  OOk):
Let x 2 OOPk./. Again this implies x 2 OP1.O1/, so x 0, x xD  12 on each D 2D
and x.MD / D jMD j C 1 for MD 2M D . We are to show that x.S/  v.S/C  for
S  V not yet fixed by Pk−1.k−1/ D OOPk−1. OOk−1/. Since x  0, we may only
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consider S D v.M/ for M 2M . Furthermore, since x.e/  1 on EnE.SD /, we
may restrict ourselves to M  E.SD /. Finally, since x  xD (D 2 D), x.M/
only depends on jM \ Dj for each D 2 D . So we may without loss of general-
ity assume that M  MD for some MD 2 M D . Assume that M is not fixed by
Pk−1.k−1/. Since MD is fixed by Pk−1.k−1/, we conclude that MDnM is not
fixed by Pk−1.k−1/. So at least some e 2 MDnM is not fixed by Pk−1.k−1/.
Hence x 2 OOPk./ implies x.e/  1− C 1. All other edges f 2MDnM satisfy
x. f /  1 (as x  12 on
S
D). Hence x.MD /D jMD j C 1 implies x.M/ jMjC 
as required.
}
Corollary 4.1. The nucleolus x of a matching game on a graph G D .V; E/ with
unit edge weights can be computed in polynomial time.
REFERENCES
[1] X. Deng, T. Ibaraki, and H. Nagamochi [1999]: Algorithmic aspects of the core of combinatorial
optimization games. Mathematics of OR 24, 751-766.
[2] X. Deng and C. Papadimitriou [1994]: On the complexity of cooperative game solution concepts.
Mathematics of OR 19, 257-266.
[3] U. Faigle, S.P. Fekete, W. Hochsta¨ttler, and W. Kern [1997]: On the complexity of testing mem-
bership in the core of min-cost spanning tree games. Int. Journal of Game Theory 26, 361-366.
[4] U. Faigle, S.P. Fekete, W. Hochsta¨ttler, and W. Kern [1998a]: The nucleon of cooperative games
and an algorithm for matching games. Mathematical Programming 83, 195-211.
[5] U. Faigle, W. Kern, and J. Kuipers [1998b]: Computing the nucleolus of min-cost spanning tree
games is N P-hard. Int. Journal of Game Theory 27, 443-450.
[6] U. Faigle, W. Kern, and J. Kuipers [1998c]: An efficient algorithm for nucleolus and prekernel
computation in some classes of TU-games. Memorandum No. 1464, University of Twente.
[7] U. Faigle, W. Kern, and D. Paulusma [1999]: Note on the computational complexity of least
core concepts for min-cost spanning tree games. Memorandum No. 1483, University of Twente (to
appear in Mathematical Methods of OR).
[8] D. Granot and F. Granot [1992]: Computational complexity of a cost allocation approach to a
fixed cost spanning forest problem. Mathematics of OR 17, 765-780.
[9] D. Granot, F. Granot, and W.R. Zhu [1998]: Characterization sets for the nucleolus. Int. Journal
of Game Theory 27, 359-374.
[10] D. Granot, M. Maschler, G. Owen, and W.R. Zhu [1996]: The kernel/nucleolus of a standard
tree game. Int. Journal of Game Theory 25, 219-244.
[11] M. Gro¨tschel, L. Lova´sz, and A. Schrijver [1988]: Geometric Algorithms and Combinatorial
Optimization. Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg.
[12] L. Lova´sz and D.M. Plummer [1986]: Matching Theory. North-Holland Mathematical Studies
vol. 121, Amsterdam.
[13] N. Megiddo [1987]: Computational complexity of the game theory approach to cost allocation
for a tree. Mathematics of OR 3, 189-196.
[14] D. Schmeidler [1969]: The nucleolus of a characteristic function game. SIAM J. of Applied
Mathematics 17, 1163-1170.
[15] T. Solymosi and T.E.S. Raghavan [1994]: An algorithm for finding the nucleolus of assignment
games. Int. Journal of Game Theory 23, 119-143.
FACULTY OF MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE, P.O.BOX 217, 7500 AE
ENSCHEDE, THE NETHERLANDS
E-mail address: fkern,paulusmag@math.utwente.nl
